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In July 2018, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ran 
a sample of photos depicting members of the 115th United States 
Congress through Amazon’s “Rekognition” software,1 a software 
designed to provide “highly accurate facial analysis, face 
comparison, and face search capabilities,” among other services.2 
The ACLU compared the congressional members’ photos to a 
database of 25,000 publicly available arrest photos.3 Despite none 
of the congressional members actually being depicted in the arrest 
photo database, Amazon’s Rekognition software found twenty-eight 
matches between the congressional members’ photos and the 
mugshots in the database.4 Upon human examination, it was clear 
these twenty-eight matches were caused by mistakes in the 
Rekognition software.5 Frighteningly, the twenty-eight mismatches 
were disproportionally people of color.6 Despite attaining some of 
the most honorable positions in the nation, these Congressional 
Members were confused with criminals.7 
In recent years, Facial Recognition Technology (FRT), like 
Amazon’s Rekognition, has become increasingly popular in a 
variety of industries.8 FRT is revolutionizing many activities that 
require a form of identification or verification.9 For example, FRT is 
 
 1. Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of 
Congress with Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-
technology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28 
[perma.cc/PL69-FWQL]. 
 2. What is Amazon Rekogniton?, AMAZON, https://docs.aws.amazon.com/rekog 
nition/latest/dg/what-is.html [perma.cc/WHQ4-R55R]. 
 3. Snow, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. (“Nearly 40 percent of Rekognition’s false matches in our test were of 
people of color, even though they make up only 20 percent of [the 115th United 
States] Congress.”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Facial Recognition: Top 7 Trends (Tech, Vendors, Markets, Use Cases, 
and Latest News), THALES (Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/ 
markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/biometrics/facial-recognition 
[perma.cc/89ME-RW34]. 
 9. See, e.g., Sintia Radu, The Technology That’s Turning Heads, U.S. NEWS 
(July 26, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/ 
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now a crucial part of how social media companies identify users in 
photos, how people unlock their phones, and how plane passengers 
check in to their flight.10 The recent proliferation of FRT is due to a 
major boom in artificial intelligence and, specifically, machine 
learning.11 Although the increased use of this novel technology may 
seem exciting and convenient, machine learning systems have been 
found to harbor forms of bias that can maintain and often increase 
inequalities.12 FRT is no exception to this frightening trend of 
“algorithmic bias,” which is defined as systematic errors in a 
computer program that lead to unfair outcomes.13 FRT manifests 
bias through a substantially better identification rate for faces with 
lighter skin and faces that exhibit traditionally-male facial features 
than faces with darker skin and faces that exhibit traditionally-
female facial features.14  
FRT’s algorithmic bias can be an offensive annoyance when it 
mistakenly tags people of color as other people15 or categorizes 




 10. Id. 
 11. Nick Statt, The AI Boom Is Happening All Over the World, and It’s 
Accelerating Quickly, VERGE (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2018/12/12/18136929/artificial-intelligence-ai-index-report-2018-machine-learning-
global-progress-research [perma.cc/M2XW-2FQ7]. 
 12. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 3 (2016) (“The math-
powered applications powering the data economy were based on choices made by 
fallible human beings. Some of these choices were no doubt made with the best 
intentions. Nevertheless, many of these models encoded human prejudice, 
misunderstanding, and bias into the software systems that increasingly managed 
our lives. Like gods, these mathematical models were opaque, their working invisible 
to all but the highest priests in their domain: mathematicians and computer 
scientists. Their verdicts, even when wrong or harmful, were beyond dispute or 
appeal. And they tend to punish the poor and the oppressed in our society, while 
making the rich richer.”). 
 13. See Nicol Turner Lee, Paul Resnick & Genie Barton, Algorithmic Bias 
Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices and Policies to Reduce Consumer Harms, 
BROOKINGS INST. (May 22, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-
bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-
harms/ [https://perma.cc/97L9-F2YS]. 
 14. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy 
Disparities in Commercial Gender Classifications, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING 
RESCH. 71, 88 (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/ 
buolamwini18a.pdf [perma.cc/D24E-9JK6]. 
 15. See TED, How I’m Fighting Bias in Algorithms | Joy Buolamwini, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UG_X_7g63rY [perma.cc/SGC2-
X3L3]. 
 16. For example, in 2015: 
 Google came under fire this week after its new Photos app categorized 
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become a matter of life and liberty when considering law 
enforcement agencies’ increased reliance on FRT in identifying 
suspects.17 FRT’s utility for law enforcement is undeniable.18 With 
FRT, law enforcement can cross-reference camera footage showing 
a criminal suspect with their database of mugshots and other 
possible photo databases to identify the suspect.19 However, law 
enforcement’s increased use of FRT, combined with FRT’s 
demonstrated algorithmic bias, may lead to a stream of 
disproportionate misidentifications that are deemed correct due to 
the perception that FRT is “objective.”20 Due to the potential 
 
photos in one of the most racist ways possible. On June 28th, computer 
programmer Jacky Alciné found that the feature kept tagging pictures of 
him and his girlfriend as “gorillas.”  
 . . . . 
 . . . Nikon and other consumer camera companies have also had a history 
of showing bias to white faces with their facial recognition software. Zunger 
says that Google has had similar issues with facial recognition due to 
inadequate analysis of skin tones and lighting.  
Loren Grush, Google Engineer Apologizes After Photos App Tags Two Black People 
as Gorillas, VERGE (July 1, 2015), https://www.theverge.com/2015/7/1/ 
8880363/google-apologizes-photos-app-tags-two-black-people-gorillas 
[perma.cc/MQD3-2ZEQ]. 
 17. FRT adds an additional layer where discrimination can occur in law 
enforcement:  
[A] demographic group that is underrepresented in benchmark datasets can 
nonetheless be subjected to frequent targeting. . . . False positives and 
unwarranted searches pose a threat to civil liberties. Some face recognition 
systems have been shown to misidentify people of color, women, and young 
people at high rates (Klare et al., 2012). Monitoring phenotypic and 
demographic accuracy of these systems as well as their use is necessary to 
protect citizens’ rights and keep vendors and law enforcement accountable 
to the public.  
Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 14, at 2; see also CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO M. 
BEDOYA & JONATHAN FRANKLE, GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH., THE 
PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 2–4 
(2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org/sites/default/files/2016-12/The Perpetual 
Line-Up - Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown Law - 121616.pdf 
[perma.cc/94GN-SJQ8]. 
 18. See, e.g., Drew Harwell, Oregon Became a Testing Ground for Amazon’s 
Facial-Recognition Policing. But What if Rekognition Goes Wrong?, WASH. POST 
(April 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/ 
04/30/amazons-facial-recognition-technology-is-supercharging-local-police/ 
[perma.cc/M639-KR3M] (providing an example of how law enforcement can utilize 
FRT to assist in arrests). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to 
Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2017) (“Both critics and 
advocates can stray into uncritical deference to the idea that big data and the 
algorithms used to process the data are somehow infallible science. . . . [A]lthough 
algorithms are decidedly not mystical things or dark magic, algorithms are not well 
understood outside the technical community.”); Nanette Byrnes, Why We Should 
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disparate impact law enforcement’s use of FRT may have on 
communities of color, law enforcement’s use of FRT must be 
carefully scrutinized to support law enforcement’s interest in 
investigative advancements while limiting the misuse of a software 
that has the potential to severely injure civil liberties. 
Part I of this Note will explain the basic science behind 
machine learning and demonstrate how well-intended 
programmers can create biased algorithms through the use of 
program training material that does not represent the United 
States’ diverse population. Part II of this Note will explore FRT’s 
utility for police investigations, then survey various agencies’ 
existing protocols for the use of FRT as well as how FRT is used in 
conventional practice. Part III of this Note will examine what role, 
if any, existing constitutional protections and statutory provisions 
can have in law enforcement use of FRT when considering concerns 
of algorithmic bias. Part IV of this Note will canvass pending and 
proposed legislative options for managing law enforcement’s use of 
FRT and curbing algorithmic bias. Part V of this Note will analyze 
the potential avenues for balancing law enforcement investigative 
efforts with concerns of disparate infringement on civil liberties and 
algorithmic misidentification. This Note will conclude by 
encouraging legislative bodies to adopt adaptive frameworks to 
constrain the concerning prospects of FRT and algorithmic bias 
without crippling advancements in police investigative technology. 
Part I: Facial Recognition Technology and Algorithmic 
Bias 
A. Facial Recognition Technology: The Basics of Machine 
Learning 
“Machine learning is a method of data analysis that automates 
analytical model building.”21 The process begins by giving a 
computer program, or algorithm, a set of test data and then 
instructing it to perform a specific task with that data.22 As the 
algorithm sorts through the data in an attempt to achieve its 
 
Expect Algorithms to Be Biased, MIT TECH. REV. (June 24, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/06/24/159118/why-we-should-expect-
algorithms-to-be-biased/ [perma.cc/5HNP-KQ8T] (“[A] broader trend that Fred 
Beneson, Kickstarter’s former data chief, calls ‘mathwashing’: our tendency to idolize 
programs like Facebook’s as entirely objective because they have mathematics at 
their core.”). 
 21. Machine Learning: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS, https://www.sas.com/ 
en_us/insights/analytics/machine-learning.html [perma.cc/5XA2-3URT]. 
 22. Id. 
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designated task, the algorithm is able to gradually perceive 
patterns and categories that allow it to achieve its designated task 
more efficiently.23 This process of developing patterns and 
categories is the crux of machine learning.24 Through these 
patterns, a machine learning system is able to determine what 
products a consumer may like due to their past purchases, who may 
default on a loan based on past financial choices, and answer many 
more predictive or analytical questions.25 
An FRT system functions similarly to other forms of machine 
learning.26 During development of an FRT system, like Amazon’s 
Rekognition, the FRT system is given a set of test data—which is 
composed of a series of images containing things such as scenery, 
people,  and other objects—and then told to sort between the faces 
and the other things present in these images.27 Once the FRT 
system is able to consistently distinguish faces from other objects, 
then the programmers task the algorithm with distinguishing one 
person’s face from another.28 The system develops an 
understanding of how different people’s facial features, their facial 
shape, and various other facial attributes can help the algorithm 
tell people apart.29 Eventually, the program will be able to process 
new photos and compare the featured faces to those already in its 
memory in order to place a name to the face.30 
B. Algorithmic Bias: How Seemingly Objective Machines 
Further Inequality 
A machine learning program is only as accurate as its test data 
trains it to be.31 A lack of foresight from programmers can 
inadvertently lead to test data either being unrepresentative of 
reality or reflective of existing biases.32 For example, in 2016, 
 
 23. Yufeng Guo, The 7 Steps of Machine Learning, MEDIUM: TOWARDS DATA SCI. 
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://towardsdatascience.com/the-7-steps-of-machine-learning-
2877d7e5548e [perma.cc/EL7V-JLMY]. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See, e.g., Desai & Kroll, supra note 20. 
 26. See Oleksii Kharkovyna, An Intro to Deep Learning for Face Recognition, 
MEDIUM: TOWARDS DATA SCI. (June 26, 2017), https://towardsdatascience.com/an-
intro-to-deep-learning-for-face-recognition-aa8dfbbc51fb [https://perma.cc/4868-
BUE6]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See SAS, supra note 21. 
 32. See Karen Hao, This Is How AI Bias Really Happens—and Why It’s So Hard 
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ProPublica examined the accuracy of a tool called COMPAS, which 
has been used in determining an appropriate sentence for convicted 
criminals.33 ProPublica found that COMPAS was almost twice as 
likely to falsely flag Black defendants as recidivists compared to 
White defendants.34 These disparities stemmed from questions the 
COMPAS model used in its recidivism risk evaluation, such as: 
“Was one of your parents ever sent to jail or prison?”35 By relying on 
data hued by existing inequalities,36 the COMPAS system 
mistakenly propagated inequalities based on supposedly race-
neutral questions like parental incarceration.37 
As an FRT program is learning, it is presented with test data, 
which, to achieve accurate results, should feature images of diverse 
faces that are representative of society.38 However, recent research 
suggests FRT test data principally features lighter-skin and 
 
to Fix, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612876/ 
this-is-how-ai-bias-really-happensand-why-its-so-hard-to-fix/ [perma.cc/6VE9-
3F3S]. 
 33. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kircher, Machine Bias, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [perma.cc/3VTJ-K5GP]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Smith and Levinson describe these inequalities:  
The disproportionate incarceration of minorities is one of the American 
criminal justice system’s most established problems. In spite of a societal 
backdrop in which descriptive claims of a ‘post-racial’ America prosper, the 
problematic racial dynamics of criminal justice persist. The numbers are 
stark and clear: one out of every twenty-nine black adult women and men 
are currently incarcerated compared with only one out of every 194 whites. 
Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 795 (2012).  
Further: 
[I]mplicit favoritism is important because it helps to drive racial disparities 
in the criminal justice system. Social scientists have linked implicit 
favoritism to the ability of jurors to accurately remember damning details 
of an alleged offense, to the evaluation of whether negative actions taken by 
another are the result of one’s disposition or instead to the circumstances 
that constrained one’s choices, and to the degree of empathic response to 
human pain. Implicit white favoritism has serious ramifications for criminal 
law and procedure because it can operate in a range of powerful ways that 
can be distinguished from traditional race-focused examples: in the way, for 
example, white drivers are pulled over less often than unseen drivers, in the 
way legislators might see white “meth” addicts as suffering from an illness 
and black “crack” addicts as criminals, and in the way prosecutors and 
jurors view a crime as more aggravated if the victim is white or see a white 
juvenile offender to be more capable of redemption. 
Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson & Zoe Robinson, Implicit White Favoritism in 
the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 875–76 (2015) (footnotes omitted). 
 37. Angwin et al., supra note 33. 
 38. Kharkovyna, supra note 26. 
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traditionally-male facial features.39 This leads FRT programs to not 
be appropriately trained on how to identify and/or distinguish 
people with darker skin or people with traditionally-female facial 
features.40 This heightened error rate for people with darker skin or 
people with traditionally-female facial features was likely not 
noticed by programmers initially because overall FRT is very 
accurate.41 It is only when an algorithm’s error rates are dissected 
along demographic lines that these concerns emerge.42 
Not all FRT programs exhibit the same magnitude of 
demographically-based error rates.43 In December 2019, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)—a 
government agency tasked with advancing measurement science, 
standards, and technology44—evaluated 189 different FRT 
algorithms from ninety-nine developers to see how these programs 
performed across variations of race, age, and sex.45 NIST’s study 
tested the programs on both “one-to-one” matching46 and “one-to-
 
 39. See Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, If You’re a White Guy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-
recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html [perma.cc/MAV4-8LP8] (“A.I. software 
is only as smart as the data used to train it. If there are many more white men than 
black women in the system, it will be worse at identifying the black women.”). 
 40. For example:  
LFW, a dataset composed of celebrity faces which has served as a gold 
standard benchmark for face recognition, was estimated to be 77.5% male 
and 83.5% White (Han and Jain, 2014). Although (Taigman et al., 2014)’s 
face recognition system recently reported 97.35% accuracy on the LFW 
dataset, its performance is not broken down by race or gender. Given these 
skews in the LFW dataset, it is not clear that the high reported accuracy is 
applicable to people who are not well represented in the LFW benchmark. 
Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 14, at 3. 
 41. See id. at 12 (“We found that all [three gender] classifiers performed best for 
lighter individuals and males overall. The classifiers performed worst for darker 
females.”). In the aggregate, gender classification accuracy ranged from 87.9% to 
93.7%, within marketable range. Id. at 11. 
 42. See Clare Garvie & Jonathan Frankle, Facial-Recognition Software Might 
Have a Racial Bias Problem, ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-underlying-bias-of-facial-recognition-
systems/476991/ [perma.cc/N2QS-K6FC]. 
 43. See PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH., FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART 3: 
DEMOGRAPHIC EFFECTS 2 (2019). 
 44. NIST is a physical sciences laboratory and a non-regulatory agency of the 
United States Department of Commerce that is tasked with advancing measurement 
science, standards, and technology. See NIST Mission, Vision, Core Competencies, 
and Core Values, NIST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/about-nist/our-
organization/mission-vision-values [perma.cc/7KDS-T9P7]. 
 45. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 43, at 1. 
 46. NIST Study Evaluated Effects of Race, Age, Sex, on Face Recognition 
Software, NIST (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/ 
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many” matching.47 NIST found that the majority of tested programs 
exhibited a higher false positive rate across each test, meaning a 
higher rate of misidentification, when the program was asked to 
evaluate non-White faces and faces with traditionally-female 
characteristics.48 The authors noted, “differentials in false positives 
in one-to-many matching are particularly important because the 
consequences could include false accusations.”49 Although some 
programs exhibited a minimal error rate,50 NIST expressed a 
general concern about organizations using FRT not appropriately 
researching or scrutinizing the specific programs their organization 
employs.51 FRT program designers have acknowledged these 
problems and are working to improve them,52 but as things stand 
currently, FRT programs are laced with algorithmic bias.53 
Part II: Law Enforcement’s Use of FRT: Investigative 
 
2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software 
[perma.cc/3N8U-Q49K] (describing “one-to-one” matching as “confirming a photo 
matches a different photo of the same person in a database . . . [which] is commonly 
used for verification work, such as unlocking a smartphone or checking a passport”).  
 47. Id. (describing “one-to-many” matching as “determining whether the person 
in the photo has any match in a database”). 
 48. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 43, at 2 (noting the tested programs varied in 
their false positive error rates “by factors of 10 to beyond 100 times”). 
 49. E.g., NIST, supra note 46. 
 50. MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION 
FOUND., THE CRITICS WERE WRONG: NIST DATA SHOWS THE BEST FACIAL 
RECOGNITION ALGORITHMS ARE NEITHER RACIST NOR SEXIST 2 (2020), 
https://itif.org/publications/2020/01/27/critics-were-wrong-nist-data-shows-best-
facial-recognition-algorithms [perma.cc/MS3N-P2HE] (“[T]he most accurate 
algorithms—which should be the only algorithms used in government systems—did 
not display a significant demographic bias . . . . [S]ome highly accurate algorithms 
had false-positive demographic differentials that were so small as to be 
‘undetectable’ for one-to-many searches.”). 
. 
 51. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 43, at 3 (“Operational implementations usually 
employ a single face recognition algorithm. Given algorithm-specific variation, it is 
incumbent upon the system owner to know their algorithm . . . . Since different 
algorithms perform better or worse in processing images of individuals in various 
demographics, policy makers, face recognition system developers, and end users 
should be aware of these differences and use them to make decisions and to improve 
future performance.”). 
 52. See Sean Hollister, Google Contractors Reportedly Targeted Homeless People 
for Pixel 4 Facial Recognition, VERGE (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.the 
verge.com/2019/10/2/20896181/google-contractor-reportedly-targeted-homeless-
people-for-pixel-4-facial-recognition [perma.cc/N8FH-25UN]. 
 53. E.g., Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 14. 
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Potential, Procedures, and Practices 
A. FRT’s Potential for Criminal Suspect Identification 
Law enforcement agencies across the United States have been 
rapidly adopting FRT as a crucial part of their investigative 
procedures.54 Federal, state, and local agencies have partnered with 
FRT designers like Amazon, Google, and others to increase their 
capabilities in identifying and tracking suspects.55 Currently, law 
enforcement agencies primarily use FRT to identify suspects from 
images captured by surveillance footage or by a witness’s camera, 
but the uses of FRT will potentially expand in the near future.56 The 
government “facial biometrics” market is expected to grow nearly 
threefold within the next decade.57 Currently, at least one fourth of 
state or local police departments have the ability to conduct 
searches through a face recognition system.58 
Law enforcement’s use of FRT is expected to revolutionize law 
enforcement’s ability to identify suspects in a similar way to the 
spread of forensic DNA identification in the late 1980s.59 Like DNA 
evidence, FRT allows officers to take a small piece of biometric 
evidence recovered from a crime scene and then cross-reference this 
 
 54. See generally Jon Schuppe, Facial Recognition Gives Police a Powerful New 
Tracking Tool. It’s Also Raising Alarms., NBC NEWS (July 30, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/facial-recognition-gives-police-powerful-
new-tracking-tool-it-s-n894936 [perma.cc/8YCS-UYKG] (discussing law 
enforcement’s use of facial recognition). 
 55. See id. 
 56. JENNIFER LYNCH, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., FACE OFF: LAW ENFORCEMENT 
USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 1 (Gennie Gebhart ed., 2020) (“Today, 
law enforcement officers can use mobile devices to capture face recognition-ready 
photographs of people they stop on the street; surveillance cameras boast real-time 
face scanning and identification capabilities; and federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies have access to hundreds of millions of images of faces of law-
abiding Americans. On the horizon, law enforcement would like to use face 
recognition with body-worn cameras, to identify people in the dark, to match a person 
to a police sketch, or even to construct an image of a person’s face from a small sample 
of their DNA.”). 
 
 57. See Jon Schuppe, How Facial Recognition Became a Routine Policing Tool in 
America, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/how-
facial-recognition-became-routine-policing-tool-america-n1004251 [perma.cc/4JZ5-
2758] (“The government ‘facial biometrics’ market . . . is expected to soar from $136.9 
million in 2018 to $375 million by 2025 . . . .”). 
 58. GARVIE ET AL., supra note 17, at 2. 
 59. See generally Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science 
Kit: DNA Databases for 21st Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
635, 640 (2000) (discussing different DNA initiatives led by the United States 
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in support of law 
enforcement). 
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evidence with their department’s databases to obtain a 
comprehensive list of information about the target suspect.60 Unlike 
DNA analysis, FRT does not require a suspect to have left some of 
their bodily tissue, fluids, or other biological material at the crime 
scene.61 FRT only requires an image of the suspect captured 
through closed-circuit television (CCTV) or some other method.62 
Already, FRT has led to the apprehension of serious criminals 
that had evaded capture for months or even years. For example, in 
December 2018, the York Area Regional Police Department was 
able to identify a man who had electronically manipulated and 
eventually sexually assaulted a fifteen-year-old girl in July 2016.63 
Despite the suspect leaving his sunglasses at the crime scene, which 
were processed for DNA and fingerprints, police were unable to 
identify the suspect until they finally received a match using facial 
recognition software.64 After months of cross-referencing the photos 
the suspect sent the victim with driver’s license photos, mugshots, 
and other sources of facial identification, law enforcement found a 
match. Law enforcement got a lucky break when the suspect 
updated his driver’s license photo to more closely resemble how he 
appeared at the time of the assault.65 The York Area Regional Police 
Department’s successful location of a suspect is just one of many 
examples of FRT assisting law enforcement when other methods of 
identifying suspects have failed.66 FRT can greatly enhance law 
 
 60. See Schuppe, supra note 57. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Daniel Rosler, Facial Recognition Software Led to the Arrest of a Scranton 
Man for Alleged Sexual Assault of Teen, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/article/e0a56374618840cf88e78637428d63d0 [perma.cc/Q2K3-
FWKD]. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See Marco della Cava & Elizabeth Weise, Capital Gazette Gunman Was 
Identified Using Facial Recognition Technology That’s Been Controversial, USA 
TODAY (June 29, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/ 
talkingtech/2018/06/29/capital-gazette-gunman-identified-using-facial-recognition-
technology/744344002/ [perma.cc/XH5X-496U] (explaining law enforcement’s use of 
facial identification technology “because the system for getting the identification off 
his fingerprints was working slowly . . . .”); Ryan Lucas, How a Tip — and Facial 
Recognition Technology — Helped the FBI Catch a Killer, NPR (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/21/752484720/how-a-tip-and-facial-recognition-
technology-helped-the-fbi-catch-a-killer [perma.cc/BCH5-XNMH]; Amy B. Wang, A 
Suspect Tried to Blend in with 60,000 Concertgoers. China’s Facial-Recognition 
Cameras Caught Him., WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/13/china-crime-
facial-recognition-cameras-catch-suspect-at-concert-with-60000-people/ 
[perma.cc/MZ4L-HRVP] (describing the use of FRT to track one individual at a 
60,000-person event in China). 
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enforcement’s capabilities,67 and potentially lead to fewer 
mistakes.68 
B. Current Police Procedures and Unadvised Practices 
Most agencies follow the same five-step process in using FRT 
to identify a suspect.69 First, officers obtain a visual representation 
of a criminal suspect.70 Second, officers prepare the visual 
representation to be entered into the FRT.71 Third, the FRT 
compares the visual representation with the system’s catalogue of 
faces, typically composed of mugshots.72 Fourth, the FRT produces 
a list of possible facial matches for an inquiring officer to review; 
each match typically comes with a coinciding confidence level, 
which demonstrates how certain the system is that the listed person 
is the targeted suspect.73 Lastly, an officer reviews the list produced 
by the FRT and determines if any of the potential matches should 
be investigated further.74 
Many law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI)75 and the New York Police Department 
 
 67. The use of FRT has been successful in many cases: 
Recently, the work of the facial identification team led to the arrest of a man 
accused of raping a worker at a day spa, and another charged with pushing 
a subway passenger onto the tracks. We have made arrests in murders, 
robberies and the on-air assault of a TV reporter. A woman whose 
dismembered body was found in trash bags in two Bronx parks was 
identified. So was a woman hospitalized with Alzheimer’s, through an old 
arrest photo for driving without a license. 
James O’Neill, How Facial Recognition Makes You Safer, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/opinion/facial-recognition-police-new-york-
city.html [perma.cc/G6L2-CC6P]. 
 68. See id. (“The software has also cleared suspects. According to the Innocence 
Project, 71 percent of its documented instances of false convictions are the result of 
mistaken witness identifications. When facial recognition technology is used as a 
limited and preliminary step in an investigation . . . these miscarriages of justice are 
less likely.”). 
 69. See Schuppe, supra note 57. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id.; see also Matt Leonard, Why Confidence Matters in Facial Recognition 
Systems, GCN (Aug. 6, 2018), https://gcn.com/Articles/2018/08/06/trust-facial-
recognition.aspx?Page=1 [perma.cc/U624-34UH] (discussing the importance of 
setting a high confidence threshold for FRT programs when used by law enforcement 
because a program’s threshold confidence level determines the occurrence of false 
positives). 
 74. See Schuppe, supra note 57. 
 75. See Facial Recognition Technology: Part II: Ensuring Transparency in 
Government Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th 
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(NYPD),76 treat the results of an FRT inquiry as an “investigative 
lead only.”77 An “investigative lead” means officers must find 
additional investigative material to reach the level of probable 
cause needed for a legitimate arrest.78 However, the FBI is 
currently considering dropping the “investigative lead only” 
protocol and allowing an FRT match to reach the level of probable 
cause based on confidence in its program and expected expansion.79 
Other law enforcement agencies, like Oregon’s Washington County 
Police Department, will only run a facial recognition search after 
establishing probable cause that a crime has been committed in 
order to locate the specific perpetrator.80 
Although there are currently some discrepancies in procedures 
related to FRT, there appears to be even larger discrepancies 
between field usage of FRT and best practice suggestions.81 A May 
2019 report from Georgetown Law’s Center on Privacy & 
 
Cong. 4 (2019) (statement of Kimberly J. Del Greco, Deputy Assistant Director, 
Criminal Justice Information Services, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter 
Del Greco Hearing Statement]. 
 76. See Clare Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed 
Data, GEORGETOWN L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.flawedfacedata.com/ [perma.cc/99ZP-SSY9]. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.; see also BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T JUST., FACE 
RECOGNITION POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEMPLATE 3 (2017) [hereinafter BJA 
TEMPLATE] (“[FRT] is not being used as an all-knowing big brother that keeps track 
of an individual’s weekly—or daily—trips to a business. More accurately, it is a lead 
generator for law enforcement to investigate criminal activity, akin to a more reliable 
eye witness [sic].”). 
 79. See Garvie, supra note 76 (“[A]n official for the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), which runs its own face recognition system, has indicated that 
the agency plans to do away with the ‘investigative lead only’ limitation altogether. 
At a conference in 2018, FBI Section Chief for Biometric Services Bill McKinsey said 
of the FBI: ‘We’re pretty confident we’re going to have face [recognition] at positive 
ID in two to three years.’”). 
 80. Shirin Ghaffary, How to Avoid a Dystopian Future of Facial Recognition in 
Law Enforcement, VOX: RECODE (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.vox.com/ 
recode/2019/12/10/20996085/ai-facial-recognition-police-law-enforcement-regulation 
[perma.cc/U4ZH-FV8V] (“[A public information officer at the Washington County, 
Oregon Police Department] told Recode that officers only use the [facial recognition] 
tools when there’s probable cause that someone has committed a crime, and only 
matches it to jail booking photos, not DMV databases. (This sets Washington County 
apart—several other police departments in the US do use DMV databases for facial 
recognition searches.) He also said the department doesn’t use Rekognition to police 
large crowds, which police in Orlando, Florida, tried to do—and failed to do 
effectively, after running into technical difficulties and sustained public criticism.”).  
 81. See Bryan Menegus, Defense of Amazon’s Face Recognition Tool Undermined 
by Its Only Known Police Client, GIZMODO (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://gizmodo.com/defense-of-amazons-face-recognition-tool-undermined-by-
1832238149 [perma.cc/K568-CGB7]. 
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Technology expressed concern with the NYPD’s FRT practices.82 
The report found that NYPD officers would enter “probe photos” of 
suspects into their FRT program and then pursue the people their 
system listed as potential suspects.83 These “probe photos” included 
composite drawings as well as “a suspect’s celebrity 
doppelgänger.”84 In addition, when NYPD officers received a sub-
par image of a suspect from surveillance footage or a witness’s 
camera, they would modify the picture in order to bring it closer to 
the style common in mugshots by inserting open eyes, mirroring a 
partial face to make it full, or substituting other identity points.85 
Georgetown researchers found these procedures to greatly diminish 
the validity of any inquiry list produced by the NYPD’s FRT.86 
During the summer of 2020, news outlets reported the first 
documented wrongful arrests caused by FRT. Two Black men from 
Michigan, Robert Williams87 and Michael Oliver,88 both suffered 
 
 82. Garvie, supra note 76 (criticizing NYPD’s facial recognition practices 
involving “probe photos” and photo edits that “amount to the fabrication of facial 
identity points”). 
 83. Id. (“There are no rules when it comes to what images police can submit to 
face recognition algorithms to generate investigative leads. As a consequence, 
agencies across the country can—and do—submit all manner of ‘probe photos,’ 
photos of unknown individuals submitted for search against a police or driver license 
database.”). 
 84. Id. (“One detective from the Facial Identification Section (FIS), responsible 
for conducting face recognition searches for the NYPD, noted that the suspect looked 
like the actor Woody Harrelson, known for his performances in Cheers, Natural Born 
Killers, True Detective, and other television shows and movies. A Google image 
search for the actor predictably returned high-quality images, which detectives then 
submitted to the face recognition algorithm in place of the suspect’s photo. In the 
resulting list of possible candidates, the detectives identified someone they believed 
was a match—not to Harrelson but to the suspect whose photo had produced no 
possible hits.”). 
 85. Id. (“Editing photos before submitting them for search is common 
practice . . . . One technique that the NYPD uses involves replacing facial features 
or expressions in a probe photo with ones that more closely resemble those in 
mugshots—collected from photos of other people.”). 
 86. Id. (finding that common FRT procedures reflect “at best an attempt to create 
information that isn’t there in the first place and at worst the introduction of 
evidence that matches someone other than the person being searched for.”). 
 87.  Paresh Dave, Facial Recognition Leads to First Wrongful U.S. Arrest 
Activists Say, REUTERS (June 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
michigan-facial-recognition/face-recognition-vendor-vows-new-rules-after-wrongful-
arrest-in-u-s-using-its-technology-idUSKBN23V1KJ [https://perma.cc/A88U-5KC7] 
(“Robert Williams, who is Black, spent over a day in Detroit police custody in January 
after Rank One’s face recognition software connected his driver’s license photo to 
surveillance video of someone shoplifting, the American Civil Liberties Union of 
Michigan (ACLU) said. . . . In a video shared by ACLU, Williams says officers 
released him after acknowledging ‘the computer’ must have been wrong.”). 
 88. Kris Holt, Facial Recognition Linked to a Second Wrongful Arrest by Detroit 
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from flawed investigations. In each case, Detroit Police ran blurry 
surveillance footage through their department’s FRT, then showed 
the generated lineup to a witness of the offense.89 Upon minimal 
examination, it should have been clear these men were 
misidentified. Michael Oliver, who has extensive tattoos on his neck 
and arms, noted the surveillance footage which led to his arrest 
“looked nothing like” him and the actual offender “didn’t even have 
tattoos.”90 Robert Williams—who was arrested in front of his wife 
and their young daughters in his driveway—stated he felt “empty” 
and “humiliated” by the experience.91 After Robert Williams case 
came to light, Detroit Police Chief James Craig admitted their FRT 
system is heavily flawed.92 Chief Craig noted at a public meeting 
that “[i]f we were just to use the technology by itself, to identify 
someone, I would say 96 percent of the time it would misidentify.”93 
It is unclear at this time how many cases like Robert Williams’ and 
Michael Oliver’s have gone unreported. 
Like any law enforcement tool or tactic, FRT comes with a 
substantial list of inspiring prospects and concerning potentials. 
FRT can revolutionize how law enforcement identifies and locates 
suspects, but its implementation needs to follow proper procedures 
 
Police, ENGADGET (July 10, 2020), https://www.engadget.com/facial-recognition-
false-match-wrongful-arrest-224053761.html [https://perma.cc/VJ9C-FLX3] 
(“[P]olice in the city arrested a man for allegedly reaching into a person’s car, taking 
their phone and throwing it, breaking the case and damaging the screen in the 
process. Facial recognition flagged Michael Oliver as a possible suspect, and the 
victim identified him in a photo lineup as the person who damaged their phone. 
Oliver was charged with a felony count of larceny over the May 2019 incident. He 
said he didn’t commit the crime and the evidence supported his claim.”). 
 89. Id.; Paresh Dave, supra note 87.  
 90. Elaisha Stokes, Wrongful Arrest Exposes Racial Bias in Facial Recognition 
Technology, CBS NEWS (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/detroit-
facial-recognition-surveillance-camera-racial-bias-crime/ [https://perma.cc/7HA5-
TZKP]. 
 91. Ahiza García-Hodges, Chiara Sottile & Jacob Ward, Man Wrongfully 
Arrested Due to Facial Recognition Software Talks About ‘Humiliating’ Experience, 
NBC NEWS (June 26, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/man-
wrongfully-arrested-due-facial-recognition-software-talks-about-humiliating-
n1232184 [https://perma.cc/25KF-6Q7H] (“Their oldest daughter nearly started 
hyperventilating and couldn’t do her homework without getting emotional since her 
dad usually helps her with it. The couple also said they’ll never forget how Williams 
missed a small but important milestone while in police custody. ‘I wasn't there for 
her first tooth,’ Williams said. ‘Even though it was one day, I still missed a milestone 
in her life.’”). 
 92. Jason Koebler, Detroit Police Chief: Facial Recognition Software 




 93. Id. 
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to ensure effective results and avoid misuse. Although some law 
enforcement agencies have done a satisfactory job of self-regulating 
their FRT use, it is critical to consider what formal legal approaches 
can moderate law enforcement use of FRT, especially considering 
FRT’s tendency to harbor algorithmic bias. 
Part III: Limits to Law Enforcement Use of FRT and 
Algorithmic Bias from the Constitution and Existing 
Civil Rights Statutes 
A. Fourth Amendment Protections from Unreasonable 
Arrest 
The Supreme Court recently determined that novel forms of 
technology may require long-running constitutional doctrines to 
adapt to circumstances once unimaginable.94 The Fourth 
Amendment, which has been one of the primary ways to regulate 
police action,95 has had to adapt to modern expectations of privacy 
and novel methods of police intrusion into those expectations of 
privacy.96 Although the Court has made some progress, many 
scholars have expressed dissatisfaction with the pace at which the 
Court is choosing to adapt the Fourth Amendment to the realities 
of technology in modern life.97 Based on the novelty of law 
 
 94. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (uprooting the 
long-held presumption that defendants forfeit all of their Fourth Amendment 
privacy interests when they turn over material to a third party). 
 95. Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 
116 (2017). 
 96. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (distinguishing 
electronic devices from other objects for purposes of the search incident to arrest 
warrant exception); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)) (“GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations . . . . And because GPS monitoring is cheap in 
comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds 
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”); Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of advanced 
technology to examine the internal affairs of a residence constitutes a search under 
the Fourth Amendment and stating “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree 
of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected 
by the advance of technology . . . . The question we confront today is what limits 
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy”). 
 97. See Eli R. Shindelman, Time for the Court to Become “Intimate” with 
Surveillance Technology, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1909, 1911–12 (2011) (“These 
advancements in surveillance technology have far outpaced the evolution of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Many scholars have argued that the current state of 
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enforcement’s use of FRT, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court 
has yet to tackle the issue of whether, or how, Fourth Amendment 
protections limit law enforcement’s use of FRT as of the writing of 
this Note.98 
Due to the current lack of precedent, scholars are left to 
speculate as to whether an FRT scan constitutes a search in 
accordance with the Fourth Amendment.99 Less attention has been 
given to FRT’s role in establishing grounds for an arrest. As stated 
above, the FBI currently holds that FRT identification can only be 
used as an “investigative lead.”100 However, with law enforcement’s 
growing confidence in FRT, the question of whether an FRT 
identification could reach the level of probable cause to support a 
lawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment will likely soon arise. 
Probable cause has been described as a “fluid concept—
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual 
contexts”101 and thus requires the “totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis” in each individual case.102 Because law enforcement 
agencies have compared FRT matches to “a more reliable eye 
witness,”103 it is useful to compare FRT matches to eyewitness or 
informant testimony. In the context of police informants, officers 
must show there are sufficient “indicia of reliability” to trust the 
testimony of an informant.104 While an anonymous tip must be 
supported by facts that can be corroborated, the testimony of a 
credible informant—who had provided officers with information in 
the past—can be enough to independently establish probable 
cause.105 With this said, the weight of an FRT match toward a 
 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence lacks a genuine understanding of privacy given 
the realities of modern technology. These scholars argue that because there has been 
widespread development in forms of technology that are capable of impinging on a 
person’s privacy, courts must interpret the Fourth Amendment broadly to 
adequately protect individual liberty.”). 
 98. See Katelyn Ringrose, Law Enforcement’s Pairing of Facial Recognition 
Technology with Body-Worn Cameras Escalates Privacy Concerns, 105 VA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 57, 64 (2019). 
 99. See Kelly Blount, Body Worn Cameras with Facial Recognition Technology: 
When It Constitutes a Search, 3 CRIM. L. PRAC., Fall 2017, at 61. See generally  
Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1591 
(2017). 
 100. Del Greco Hearing Statement, supra note 75, at 4. 
 101. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 
 102. Id. at 238–39. 
 103. BJA TEMPLATE, supra note 78, at 3. 
 104. Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000). 
 105. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972). 
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probable cause determination will rest on whether judges believe 
FRT is sufficiently reliable to justify a showing of probable cause.106 
In determining the perceived reliability of FRT, an analogy 
between FRT matches and DNA matches is appropriate because 
both are founded in biometric identification.107 The reliability of all 
DNA matches was widely contested until courts began allowing for 
judicial notice of DNA’s reliability.108 This holding allowed courts to 
assume DNA matches are accurate enough to be admissible as long 
as the expert properly performed the techniques involved in 
analyzing a specific DNA specimen.109  In the coming years, FRT 
matches could progress from being treated in the same way as an 
eyewitness identification to being seen more like DNA evidence—as 
inherently reliable absent proof of technical mistakes. However, an 
important component of courts extending judicial notice to DNA 
matches’ reliability was the near unanimous acceptance of the 
genetic theories underlying DNA analysis by the relevant scientific 
community.110 Currently, there is not a unanimous scientific 
consensus supporting the validity of FRT due to continuing 
concerns of algorithmic bias and general efficiency.111 Therefore, the 
prospect of informed judicial notice of FRT seems unlikely at the 
current time. As FRT advances it should be met with the same, if 
not more, skepticism than DNA evidence underwent during its 
infancy.112 
 
 106. Cf. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 799–800 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding 
that DNA profiling evidence can be reliable enough for a court to take judicial notice). 
 107. See LYNCH, supra note 56, at 4 (listing “face recognition” and “DNA” as 
examples of biometric identification that are becoming more popular). 
 108. See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 799–800 (“[I]t appears that in future cases with a 
similar evidentiary issue, a court could properly take judicial notice of the general 
acceptability of the general theory and the use of these specific [DNA analysis] 
techniques . . . . Beyond such judicial notice, the threshold for admissibility should 
require only a preliminary showing of reliability of the particular data to be offered, 
i.e., some indication of how the laboratory work was done and what analysis and 
assumptions underlie the probability calculations.”) (citation omitted). 
 109. See id. 
 110. Id. at 799 (“[T]he general theories of genetics which support DNA profiling 
are unanimously accepted within the scientific community.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 14, at 3 (discussing research 
covering “[f]ace detection and classification algorithms” used by law enforcement 
that indicates lower accuracy “for people labeled female, Black, or between the ages 
of 18–30 than for other demographic cohorts”). 
 112. Cf. Tracy & Morgan, supra note 59, at 636, 638 (“[T]he current proliferation 
of DNA databases and their likely further expansion raise three significant policy 
issues and attendant questions. First, how do we utilize this new technology, while 
protecting against misuse and abuse? . . . Although technology makes certain 
advances possible, are these advances truly necessary? . . . [W]ill DNA databases 
provide law enforcement and the subsequent criminal prosecutions with measurable 
and significant effects on crime?”). 
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The Fourth Amendment has typically not been a respite for 
those concerned with discriminatory policies.113 Invasions of privacy 
or seizures of one’s person or belongings that comply with probable 
cause but are based on discriminatory intent are not considered 
violations of the Fourth Amendment.114 The Court has determined 
the subjective, potentially discriminatory, intent of an arresting 
officer plays no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis.115 The constitutional basis for objecting to law 
enforcement’s intentionally discriminatory application of laws is 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, not the 
Fourth Amendment.116 It is unclear how precisely the Fourth 
Amendment would be applied to unintentional discriminatory 
actions related to programs controlled by algorithmic bias, but it is 
most likely that algorithmic bias would influence the determination 
of whether probable cause is actually present in a given case. 
B. Equal Protection Clause as a Response to Algorithmic 
Bias 
It is worth considering how the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment could remedy concerns of algorithmic bias. 
Plaintiffs pursuing a race-based117 Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause claim against the government have one of two 
routes to prevail on their claim.118 The first route requires the 
contested government policy to contain an explicit racial 
 
 113. See Jonathan P. Feingold, Equal Protection Design Defects, 91 TEMP. L. REV. 
513, 516 (2019). 
 114. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 115. Id. (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 138 (1978) (referencing 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973))) (“[W]e said that ‘subjective 
intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.’ 
We described Robinson as having established that ‘the fact that the officer does not 
have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal 
justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.’ We think these cases foreclose 
any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the 
actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”). 
 116. Id. (“We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits 
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the 
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws 
is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 117. Feingold, supra note 113. This article uses race-based Equal Protection 
Clause doctrine as an example because it is often reviewed with the strictest level of 
scrutiny, as opposed to, for example, gender-based Equal Protection Clause claims 
which are only reviewed with intermediate scrutiny. Therefore, race-based Equal 
Protection Clause analysis provides the best potential for exploring the effectiveness 
of Equal Protection claims in this area. 
 118. Id. at 516–17. 
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classification.119 The plaintiff then must show this racial 
classification does not withstand strict judicial scrutiny.120 Strict 
scrutiny means the government policy containing the racial 
classification must be shown to lack either a compelling government 
interest or a narrowly tailored approach to fulfilling the policy’s 
governmental interest.121 
The second route for an Equal Protection Clause claim 
requires a plaintiff to show “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent 
or purpose”122 in the adoption or maintaining of the contested 
government policy.123 A plaintiff need not demonstrate 
discrimination was the dominant or primary purpose of the 
contested governmental policy, but a plaintiff must show 
discrimination was at least a consideration of those instituting the 
policy or enforcing the policy.124 The requirement of discriminatory 
intent under the Equal Protection Clause means a plaintiff cannot 
pursue a disparate impact claim under this Clause.125 
Scholars have critiqued this bifurcated approach to the Equal 
Protection Clause, which favors facial neutrality and is only 
concerned with disparate treatment.126 This judicial approach has 
led to many societal issues without an appropriate avenue of 
recourse in the courts.127 One of the clearest examples is the well-
known sentencing disparities between crack cocaine and powder 
cocaine offenses.128 Scholars have expressed further concern about 
 
 119. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Cronson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989). 
 120. The Court in City of Richmond found: 
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based 
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 
‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by 
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the 
purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by 
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to 
warrant use of a highly suspect tool. 
Id. at 493. 
 121. Strict Scrutiny, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law. 
cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny [perma.cc/YB9Q-2QX8]. 
 122. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 
(1977). 
 123. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982). 
 124. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. 
 125. Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 726 n.3 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 126. Feingold, supra note 113. 
 127. Ashlee Riopka, Equal Protection Falling Through the Crack: A Critique of the 
Crack-to-Powder Sentencing Disparity, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 121, 122 (2015). 
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Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 still contained a disparity of 18:1). Riopka continues: 
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the Court’s presumption that “facially neutral evaluative tools 
produce racially neutral results.”129 Scholars have noted that the 
Equal Protection Clause is not an appropriate avenue for disparities 
caused by algorithms due to the Court’s bifurcated approach solely 
being concerned with disparate treatment, which requires a 
showing of discriminatory intent.130 
C. Civil Rights Statutes as a Response to Algorithmic Bias 
in Police Systems 
Civil rights statutes are often viewed as a set of tools—more 
flexible than the Equal Protection Clause—that aggrieved plaintiffs 
can use to seek justice. For police conduct and policy there is a 
diminished set of tools available compared to discrimination in 
fields like housing,131 employment,132 or public accommodations.133 
Each of these fields of discrimination, besides police conduct and 
policy,134 have a simple disparate impact route for aggrieved 
plaintiffs to pursue.135 Police conduct and policy, on the other hand, 
are usually addressed through 42 U.S.C. § 1983,136 which allows for 
civil suits against a person acting under color of law stemming from 
 
Since the Fair Sentencing Act is facially race-neutral, its racially disparate 
impact provides the most obvious evidence of an equal protection violation. 
Unfortunately, defendants who rely solely on this method of proof will face 
a multitude of challenges. While the Supreme Court has not specifically 
invalidated disparate impact theory as a method of proving discriminatory 
intent in equal protection challenges, additional hurdles make disparate 
impact arguments difficult. Under the current trend of equal protection 
jurisprudence, evidence of racial disparity remains constitutionally 
insignificant unless it is accompanied by evidence of disparate treatment or 
intentional discrimination. 
Id. at 131. 
 129. See Feingold, supra note 113, at 528–29 (“[E]qual protection doctrine 
rests on the presumption that facially neutral evaluative tools produce racially 
neutral results. This presumption spans Justices and ideological 
spectrums . . . . [However] decades of research on implicit bias and stereotype 
threat reveals that common measures of merit, although facially neutral, fail 
to produce racially neutral results.”). 
 130. Id. at 539–40. 
 131. See, e.g., David J. Frizell & Ronald D. Cucchiaro, Fair Housing Act—
Disparate Impact, 36 N.J. PRAC., LAND USE LAW § 20.28 (3d ed. 2019). 
 132. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—Burden of Proof; Disparate 
Impact, OH. EMPL. PRAC. L. § 2:16 (2019). 
 133. See, e.g., B.E. Witkin, Economic Criteria and Disparate Impact, 8 WITKIN 
SUM. 11TH CONST. L. § 1012 (2020). 
 134. See Alisa Tiwari, Disparate-Impact Liability for Policing, 129 YALE L.J. 252 
(2019). 
 135. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). 
 136. Stephen R. McAllister & Peyton H. Robinson, The Potential Civil Liability of 
Law Enforcement Officers and Agencies, 67 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 14, 22 (1998). 
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the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws.”137 
The protections extended under § 1983 are inherently linked 
to other laws through the language “secured by the Constitution 
and laws.”138 An aggrieved plaintiff must pinpoint a violation of 
either one of their constitutional rights or a right granted by statute 
to have a chance of prevailing in their § 1983 claim.139 In terms of 
police use of investigative tools exhibiting algorithmic bias, there is 
no clear constitutional right to which a plaintiff suing under § 1983 
can point, and only a minimal chance for a statutory right. As 
discussed above, in sections III(a) and III(b), the Fourth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause—the two most likely 
constitutional provisions applicable to algorithmic bias—are not 
appropriate means for a plaintiff suing under § 1983 in those 
circumstances. With regard to statutory rights, a likely candidate 
for plaintiffs to attach their § 1983 claim is Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. 
Title VI, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in 
programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance,140 
including many law enforcement organizations.141 While a private 
citizen can link a civil claim through § 2000d, this base provision 
“prohibits only intentional discrimination.”142 Government agencies 
can promulgate regulations under § 2000d-1 that “may validly 
proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups, 
even though such activities are permissible under” § 2000d.143 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court determined that private 
individuals may not sue to enforce disparate-impact regulation 
promulgated through § 2000d-1.144 This ruling leaves private actors 
with no clear method to combat police use of investigative tools 
 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Martin A. Schwartz, Introduction: Section 1983 Rights Are “Personal”, SEC. 
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received more than $1.47 billion.”). 
 142. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001). 
 143. Id. at 281. 
 144. Id. at 282. 
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exhibiting algorithmic bias. Although § 2000d-1 cannot assist 
private actors in their complaints, it does provide a potential course 
for federal departments and agencies to regulate police use of 
investigative tools exhibiting algorithmic bias through disparate 
impact regulation. 
Part IV: Novel Legislative Responses to Law Enforcement 
Use of FRT and Algorithmic Bias 
A. Moratoriums on Law Enforcement Use of FRT and 
Legislators’ Expressed Concerns 
Concerns about law enforcement use of FRT has led several 
municipalities to pass moratoriums, or outright bans, on law 
enforcement’s use of the technology to pursue suspects or monitor 
crowds.145 In May 2019, San Francisco became the first U.S. city to 
ban law enforcement use of FRT.146 Advocates for the ban stated 
FRT “as it exists today is unreliable, and represent[s] an 
unnecessary infringement on people’s privacy and liberty.”147 
Additionally, advocates for the ban argued FRT is “error prone, 
particularly when dealing with women or people with darker 
skin.”148 The lead sponsor for a similar piece of legislation, which 
passed in Somerville, Massachusetts near the end of 2019, stated 
many of his constituents “are worried about the consequences of 
[FRT] whose capabilities are outpacing the public’s understanding 
of its power.”149 A small but growing number of cities have passed 
similar bans as San Francisco and Somerville.150 
 
 145. See Nicole Martin, The Major Concerns Around Facial Recognition 
Technology, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
nicolemartin1/2019/09/25/the-major-concerns-around-facial-recognition-technology/ 
#256162984fe3 [perma.cc/BA6V-LFEL]. 
 146. Dave Lee, San Francisco Is First US City to Ban Facial Recognition, BBC 
(May 14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48276660 [perma.cc/5W6X-
ASH4]. 
 147. Id. 
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 149. Sarah Wu, Somerville City Council Passes Facial Recognition Ban, BOSTON 
GLOBE (June 27, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/06/27/somerville-
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SCYK/story.html [perma.cc/RL5E-PN9T]. 
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City to Ban Facial Recognition, BOSTON (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.boston.com/ 
news/local-news/2020/01/14/cambridge-facial-recognition [perma.cc/JL76-G7Z3]; 
Sarah Ravani, Oakland Bans Use of Facial Recognition Technology, Citing Bias 
Concerns, S.F. CHRON. (July 17, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bay 
area/article/Oakland-bans-use-of-facial-recognition-14101253.php#:~:text=The# 
[perma.cc/XHQ2-4CV5]. 
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Concern about the proliferation of FRT is a surprisingly 
bipartisan issue considering our polarizing time.151 Democrats have 
shown apprehension toward FRT due to FRT’s algorithmic bias.152 
Senator Cory Booker clearly expressed this concern in proposing the 
“No Biometric Barriers to Housing Act” when he stated “[u]sing 
facial recognition technology in public housing without fully 
understanding its flaws and privacy implications seriously harms 
our most vulnerable communities . . . .”153 Republicans have 
concerns about government expansion, a sentiment made clear by a 
spokesperson for Rep. Jim Jordan, who stated “[f]acial recognition 
is concerning from the perspective of government having too much 
power . . . . It’s an instinctive civil libertarian and constitutionalist 
perspective.”154 These bipartisan concerns demonstrate both the 
breadth of unease towards FRT as well as the real possibility of a 
joint, productive legislative response to FRT at the federal level. 
B. Algorithmic Accountability Laws: Bringing Machine 
Bias into the Light 
For many years, companies and law enforcement agencies 
operated and distributed their FRT programs in a secretive way.155 
Only recently have companies and law enforcement agencies 
become slightly more transparent when it comes to their 
relationship and the joint use of FRT.156 A recent troubling example 
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 156. Cf. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We 
Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/ 
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of this secrecy, and at times overt deception, is the small tech start-
up called Clearview AI.157 Clearview AI devised a groundbreaking 
facial recognition app, which became subject to public scrutiny in 
January 2020 after the publication of a New York Times article by 
technology reporter Kashmir Hill.158 Despite having limited 
knowledge about how Clearview AI works or who is behind it, 
hundreds of law enforcement agencies have begun using Clearview 
AI.159 Clearview AI has now been shown to purposefully obfuscate 
investigations into its practices and to deceive its partners.160 As 
Hill was investigating Clearview AI, it became apparent that 
Clearview AI was purposefully trying to inhibit her from finding 
information.161 Additionally, Clearview AI has claimed that they 
only intend to provide their powerful tool to law enforcement 
agencies, but ample reporting has demonstrated this is untrue.162  
In response to public outcry, Clearview AI has tried to display more 
transparency. One such effort included Clearview AI releasing a 
study that claims they found no algorithmic bias in their system,163 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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however some groups have taken issue with the methodology used 
in these self-evaluations and call for third-party oversight.164 
Cases of private companies, like Clearview AI, falsely claiming 
to self-regulate have caused some lawmakers to demand more 
transparency and accountability for the implementation of 
increasingly common algorithmic systems.165 One method of 
legislating the AI field is the use of “Algorithmic Impact 
Statements,” similar to environmental impact statements, which 
demand private organizations and government agencies to self-
evaluate the efficacy and potential discriminatory effects of their 
algorithms.166 In April 2019, three members of Congress proposed 
the first federal legislation following the Algorithmic Impact 
Statement Model.167 Their bill, titled the Algorithmic 
Accountability Bill of 2019, would authorize the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to create regulations requiring companies under 
its jurisdiction to conduct impact assessments of highly sensitive 
automated decision systems.168 In supporting the bill, 
Representative Yvette D. Clark stated that “[a]lgorithms shouldn’t 
have an exemption from our anti-discrimination laws. Our bill 
recognizes that algorithms have authors, and without diligent 
oversight, they can reflect the biases of those behind the 
keyboard.”169 
The Algorithmic Accountability Bill of 2019 would only cover 
private companies through the FTC’s oversight capacity,170 but 
subsequent legislation has been introduced to address government 
use of algorithms. One example in the field of law enforcement is 
Representative Mark Takano’s Justice in Forensic Algorithms 
Act.171 In expressing concern for criminal defendants’ due process 
rights, Representative Takano has stated: 
Forensic algorithms are black boxes, and we need to be able to 
look inside to understand how the software works and to give 
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defendants the ability to challenge them. My legislation will 
open the black box of forensic algorithms and establish 
standards that will safeguard our Constitutional right to a fair 
trial.172 
Notably, the Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act would amend the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to prohibit the use of trade secret 
privileges to prevent defendants from accessing algorithms used in 
their prosecution.173 The Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act would 
also direct NIST to establish Computational Forensic Algorithms 
Standards and a Computational Forensic Algorithms Testing 
Program.174 In developing these standards, NIST would be directed 
to consider a variety of factors including algorithms’ potential for 
disparate impact across protected classes in standards and 
testing.175 After NIST establishes their standards, federal law 
enforcement would then be required to follow them.176 These pieces 
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of proposed legislation allow for some degree of oversight, but as of 
the writing of this Note it is unclear if they will actually become law. 
C. Legislative Suggestions from Scholars on FRT and 
Algorithmic Bias 
University-affiliated experts177 and non-profit groups178 have 
drafted model legislation calling for a variety of reforms related to 
the use of algorithms generally and specifically as they apply to 
FRT. Clare Garvie, a senior associate at the Georgetown University 
Center on Privacy and Technology, believes a moratorium on the 
use of FRT should be put in place until FRT regulations are passed 
requiring “minimum photo quality standards, accuracy testing, and 
publicly available reports . . . on how the government uses facial 
recognition tech.”179 Garvie further calls for a private right of action 
if law enforcement did not follow these best practices.180 In addition 
to suggesting formal legislation, Garvie also provided a list of thirty 
recommendations for a variety of actors involved in the production, 
utilization, and potential regulation of FRT.181 Of note, Garvie 
recommended that NIST “[r]egularly include tests for algorithmic 
bias along the lines of race, gender, and age in facial recognition 
competitions,” along with four other recommendations for NIST.182 
Kartik Hosanagar, a University of Pennsylvania technology 
professor, takes a more expansive view on algorithmic 
accountability. Hosanagar proposes an “Algorithmic Bill of Rights” 
to manage the many risks and benefits that come with continued 
proliferation of algorithms in the United States’ most vital 
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Recommendation 27: Develop and distribute diverse datasets of photos.”). 
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systems.183 Sigal Samuel from Vox News spoke with ten experts in 
the field of AI, including Kartik Hosanagar and Joy Buolamwini,184 
to compose a formal list of ten rights Americans would have under 
an “Algorithmic Bill of Rights.”185 This composite of rights echoes 
the themes of transparency and redress emphasized in the proposed 
Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019 and the Justice in Forensic 
Algorithms Act of 2019. Two specific rights proposed—“Freedom 
from Bias”186 and “Independent Oversight”187—are critical to the 
management of algorithmic bias and FRT. The two rights would 
ensure algorithms were regularly tested for bias and that the tests 
were performed by third-party organizations in real-world 
situations.188 This collaborative list from a variety of concerned 
experts in the field of AI could provide legislators with a substantial 
framework for future legislative proposals. 
Part V: Finding the Balance Between Investigative 
Advancements and Civil Liberties 
Like forensic DNA before it, FRT will revolutionize law 
enforcement’s investigative effectiveness.189 Law enforcement’s 
increased capacity to identify, and potentially locate, suspects with 
only a photo or a still image from a video is expected to lead to an 
increase in the apprehension of evasive criminals,190 prevention of 
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acts of mass violence,191 and recovery of victims of human 
trafficking.192 As with most law enforcement processes, the express 
intent of law enforcement’s increased reliance on FRT is to protect 
our society and achieve a feeling of justice for the victims of criminal 
behavior.193 However, these intended objectives need to be 
reconciled with the fact that powerful police efforts often affect 
historically marginalized communities more than others.194 
Although law enforcement may have the best of intentions, human 
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implicit bias, and now algorithmic bias, can result in atrocious 
disparities and mistreatment.195 
The Equal Protections Clause’s jurisprudence, as it currently 
stands, is not designed to remedy the modern problem of police use 
of systems containing algorithmic bias. The requirement to prove 
discriminatory intent under the Equal Protection Clause makes it 
difficult to apply to a seemingly unintended and unexpected source 
of discrimination, namely algorithmic bias.196 The misleading 
perception that machines are inherently objective and “infallible”197 
further complicates this issue and may actually conceal 
discriminatory human intent behind mechanical objectivity.198 
The Fourth Amendment also does not appear to be a likely 
avenue to address algorithmic bias. The Court’s decision in Whren 
v. United States makes it clear that the Fourth Amendment’s 
probable cause analysis should not factor in an officer’s subjective 
intent.199 The Court’s ruling in Whren makes it appear that 
discriminatory undertones have no role in determining the presence 
of a Fourth Amendment violation.200 However, algorithmic bias may 
affect the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause analysis by drawing 
into question the reliability of FRT matches in meeting the 
necessary standard of proof.201 Police use of FRT matches could be 
compared to the police consulting with an informant known to be 
unreliable.202 However, because the Fourth Amendment’s probable 
cause analysis is so flexible, it is unlikely judges will find an FRT 
match, combined with other minor information, does not reach the 
level of probable cause, even given FRT’s algorithmic bias.203 
Legislative or agency action is the most fitting way to address 
the quickly evolving prospects associated with law enforcement’s 
increased use of FRT because of the adaptive approach these routes 
can provide. Constitutional solutions, even if they were viable, may 
be too rigid to appropriately balance the nuanced and ever-changing 
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interests at play with law enforcement’s use of FRT.204 The Court 
has admitted when discussing the canon of constitutional avoidance 
that settling an issue through a constitutional decision can limit 
legislative flexibility.205 Additionally, if the legislature assigned 
regulatory power to an executive agency, as proposed in the 
Algorithmic Accountability Bill of 2019206 or the Justice in Forensic 
Algorithms Bill of 2019,207 then the assigned agency could use its 
expertise to generate fitting responses to advancements in 
technology and investigative tactics.208 
Specifically, NIST must have the authority to set clear 
standards about algorithmic bias and FRT specifically, which 
federal law enforcement and local law enforcement receiving federal 
funds would be required to follow. It is in the best interest of the 
United States for Congress to follow the suggestions of 
Representative Mark Takano209 and Clare Garvie210 in assigning 
power to NIST. As algorithms proliferate in American society, and 
more concerningly, the criminal justice system, there needs to be a 
central regulator that guides these rapid advancements. NIST has 
made some advancements in this role through studies like the 
Facial Recognition Vendor Test, which showed the majority of FRT 
programs exhibit bias.211 However, NIST needs greater authority to 
act on these sorts of findings. For example, NIST should be able to: 
(1) mandate federal law enforcement to use those FRT programs 
that exhibit the lowest demographically-based error rate;212 (2) 
draft strict protocol outlining best practices for law enforcement use 
of FRT;213 (3) perform regular audits of law enforcement use of 
FRT;214 and (4) require law enforcement agencies to be transparent 
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in their use of FRT and their partnerships with manufacturers.215 
NIST could also use 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 to establish regulations 
that would allow NIST to enforce disparate impact theories related 
to FRT. Until this sort of authority is given to a responsible 
government agency or the legislature imposes some clear regulatory 
system, we are left hoping that FRT companies and law 
enforcement behave themselves,216 because existing legal 
frameworks are not suitable to this new wave of invasive 
discrimination.217 
Conclusion 
Law and technology have always been engaged in a cat and 
mouse chase, with law unsuccessfully trying to catch up to 
advancements in technology. FRT and algorithmic bias are some of 
the most recent examples of technology evolving just outside the 
reach of judicial precedent. The more adaptive portions of 
government, namely the legislature and government agencies, need 
to work towards creating a comprehensive framework to deal with 
FRT and algorithmic bias before the proliferation of these systems 
reaches a critical mass. There are examples worldwide of countries 
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already using FRT at a near dystopian level.218 In the United States, 
we need to cultivate an adaptive legal framework before FRT, and 
its underlying algorithmic bias, get further out of hand.219 Proactive 
solutions, like the proposed and model legislation described above, 
must be instituted to reduce the gap between legal theory and 
technological realities. 
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